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Introduction 
 
 
The Last Bastion of the Syrian Revolt 
Southern Syria Offers Non-military Venues to Strengthen the Moderates 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
After almost four years of civil war, most of Syria since has been carved up between 
the regime, Kurdish militia and Jihadists, with the exception of the south, where civic 
organizations in areas outside regime control have room to operate and Western and 
Arab support has helped moderate rebels remain significant players. Yet, their position 
has become tenuous as the local al-Qaeda affiliate has taken the lead in fighting the 
Assad regime in the south and as the priority of the United States shifted to curbing 
hardline Jihadists through airstrikes in Syria and Iraq. Saving the south as a model that 
could halt the disintegration of Syria would require a change in the ambivalent posi-
tion of outside powers to help Western-backed rebels advance against the regime. Ger-
many and other European countries doubtful of a military approach can still help open 
the region to more streamlined civilian support and shape a stalled UN ceasefire initia-
tive focused on Aleppo to be tried in the south, where the military balance is less tilted 
toward Assad and the stakes are higher if breaches occur. 
 
Street demonstrations against President 
Bashar al-Assad’s rule first erupted in 
March 2011 in the city of Deraa, weeks after 
the arrest of 15 children who scribbled 
graffiti inspired by pro-democracy slogans 
in Tunisia and Egypt. The seizure and tor-
ture of the children might have become a 
footnote in the Assad regime’s history of 
violence had it not been for the close-knit 
society in the Deraa governorate and dis-
content at the time over abuses by the 
region’s security chief, who was a relative 
of Assad. Indeed, the south’s sense of iden-
tity was awakened by the dismissive reac-
tion of the ruling Alawite elite to the popu-
lar outrage over the children’s arrest. 
Composition of Syria’s South 
The south is comprised of the three prov-
inces of Deraa, Qunaitira, and Suwaida, 
which contains the wheat-producing 
Hauran plain and borders Jordan. Deraa, 
the largest governorate, is marked by the 
influence of large families (ashaer), its social 
mobilization in times of need (faza’a), as 
well as high levels of schooling, as com-
pared to the rest of Syria. 
Decades of divide-and-rule tactics by the 
Assad regime altered Syrian society, and 
a new avenue for upward mobility became 
holding membership in the ruling Baath 
Party. Its brand of national socialist dogma 
and support for peasants found some appeal 
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in the south, and party membership was 
more widespread in Deraa compared to 
other parts of Syria. At the same time, def-
erence continued to be paid to established 
clans. The society is deeply conservative, 
but religion has been imbued with a local 
tradition of moderation dating back to al-
Nawawi – a 13th century religious scholar – 
and other Islamic jurists from Deraa. 
Geographically, the Damascus-Amman 
highway cordons off the province into a 
flat western sector that includes the city of 
Deraa, where the Aba Zeed, al-Mahameed, 
and al-Masalmeh clans are prominent. 
Other large Deraa families, such as Zu’bi 
and al-Rusheidat, are split up between 
Deraa and Jordan. East of the highway lie 
the ancient town of Busra al-Sham, which 
has a Shiite minority, and Busra al-Harir, 
home to the Hariri family, Hauran’s biggest 
clan. Bedouins from the Shummar tribe, 
which has a large presence in Syria, Iraq, 
and Saudi Arabia, inhabit a rough rocky 
terrain known as al-Lajah. 
The region extends to the outskirts of 
Damascus and it has served traditionally as 
a haven for smugglers and illicit activities. 
Ties between the south and the Arab Gulf 
states have been enhanced by thousands 
of engineers, teachers, doctors, and other 
professionals from Deraa who fled to Saudi 
Arabia during the rule of Assad’s father, the 
late Hafez al-Assad, in the 1980s to escape a 
bloody persecution of the Muslim Brother-
hood. In addition, poor neighborhoods that 
ring Damascus from the south, such as Hajar 
al-Aswad and Qadam, are largely inhabited 
by people from Deraa and its Golan Heights 
hinterland. Administratively, the Israeli-
occupied Golan Heights are part of the gov-
ernorate of Qunaitira, west of Deraa. The 
two provinces are linked economically, 
with Qunaitira, which is mainly pasture-
land, providing cattle and dairy products 
for Deraa and the rest of Hauran. 
After the Israeli occupation of the Golan 
Heights in the 1967 war, Golan Heights 
refugees and their descendants poured into 
Damascus and sank into poverty and desti-
tution. Many blamed Hafez al-Assad, who 
was defense minister at the time, for losing 
their land. When the revolt broke out in 
2011, one of the first street slogans in Deraa 
mocked Bashar’s brother Maher, who heads 
the elite Fourth Armored Division, daring 
him to send his troops to liberate the Golan. 
Indeed, the division’s forerunner, the so-
called Defense Brigades, had overrun the 
city of Hama in 1982. The division has re-
mained geared toward internal repression, 
although it is the army’s best-equipped and  
-trained unit. 
Pressure Boils Over 
Confident in the security apparatus, 
Bashar al-Assad publicly belittled any need 
for democratic reforms and showed little 
interest in defusing brewing unrest in 
Deraa. His cousin Atef Najib, head of Mili-
tary Intelligence in Deraa and de facto 
viceroy of the city, refused to release the 15 
arrested children at a meeting with Deraa 
notables in March 2011. In the following 
weeks and months, hundreds of demon-
strators were killed in the south before the 
revolt began militarizing in the second half 
of 2011. By 2013, the rise of jihadist brigades 
would undermine the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), the nucleus of the armed effort 
against the Assad regime. 
Mass discontent had been gathering 
momentum for years against Najib, whose 
grip on Deraa was marked by extortion 
that reached into people’s daily lives and 
restrained a new class of Sunni entrepre-
neurs that had emerged as a consequence 
of economic liberalization but hit a wall 
of bureaucracy and corruption. In the agri-
culture sector, security bans on the sale of 
fertilizers became lucrative business for 
mostly Alawite intelligence operatives, who 
allowed farmers to buy fertilizers in return 
for bribes. Restrictions were also placed on 
property transactions in the south under 
the pretext of it being a border region. The 
regulations translated into income for 
Najib and his cohorts. 
Regionally, the Assad regime had be-
come more closely associated with Shiite 
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Iran and encouraged proselytization drives 
financed by Iran to convert rural Sunni 
Syrians to Shiism. Several Shiite places of 
worship, known as hussainiyat, were built 
in the south. In contrast to poorer eastern 
regions of Syria near Iraq, the campaign 
did not gain traction, but “Shiitization” 
contributed to rising resentment against 
Assad and the secret police in Deraa. 
Military Balance 
Before the uprising, up to one-third of the 
Syrian army, around 90,000 troops, was 
deployed in Hauran, which was regarded 
as the primary defensive line against Israel. 
After the revolt militarized, dozens of bases 
belonging to Assad’s army and intelligence 
dotting the hills of Qunaitira and Deraa 
slowly but steadily fell in attacks, mostly 
spearheaded by the al-Nusra Front – the 
al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria – with the partici-
pation of FSA brigades grouped under the 
Deraa Military Council umbrella and backed 
by a US-led Military Operations Center 
(MOC) in Jordan. 
The presence of the Nusra Front in 
Qunaitira was strengthened by several 
hundred fighters who fled to the area after 
they were routed from the eastern province 
of Deir al-Zor in June 2014 by the so-called 
Islamic State – the other al-Qaeda offshoot 
that had declared a caliphate. The Nusra 
Front has intensified its attacks in Qunai-
tira since then, capturing several positions 
facing Israeli troops in the Golan across a 
UN-patrolled armistice line, including old 
Qunaitira – which had been almost com-
pletely flattened by Israeli troops before 
they withdrew from what then became the 
buffer zone in 1974 – and a nearby crossing 
on the armistice line. Al-Harra, one of the 
positions that fell, apparently served as an 
eavesdropping base under Russian com-
mand. The presence of UN peacekeepers in 
the buffer zone eventually became unten-
able. Most of the mission was forced to with-
draw to Israeli-controlled territory in 2014. 
But the Assad regime still maintains large 
military and security bases in the Qunaitira 
Map:  
Southern Syria 
and Deraa provinces, boosted by guerrillas 
from the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, 
who deployed in areas facing Israeli troops 
on the Golan and in Busra al-Harir. Several 
armored divisions and regime intelligence 
units are headquartered in the towns of Izra’ 
and Sanamayn on the Damascus–Amman 
highway and in the province of Suwaida, 
whose Druze population has remained 
largely on the sidelines of the current con-
flict. The regime also holds the Nassib border 
crossing east of Deraa, and container trucks 
– mainly carrying produce from Lebanon 
and Syria to Jordan and the Gulf – still pass 
Nassib via a Suwaida detour. In the city of 
Deraa, the FSA and jihadist brigades hold 
most of the old city as well as a secondary 
border crossing with Jordan that has been 
closed. The regime is concentrated in the 
eastern sector of Deraa, from where Assad’s 
forces fire artillery across the city and on 
nearby rebel villages and towns. 
A 2012 regime campaign of aerial and 
artillery bombardment against residential 
neighborhoods across the Hauran drove 
tens of thousands of families to Jordan at 
the same time as a refugee influx from Homs 
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in central Syria was underway. Complain-
ing of the costs of hosting the incomers 
and citing security risks, Jordan had quietly 
closed its borders in front of the refugees 
by October 2014 after having received at 
least 620,000 people, many of whom have 
relatives among northern Jordanian fami-
lies. A snowstorm in early 2015 resulted in 
a respite from regime barrel-bombings in 
the Hauran, but by mid-January the bom-
bardment had resumed. 
The rebels in Deraa and the rest of south-
ern Syria continue to project a sense of 
moderation and a consensual streak. Major 
confrontations within the armed opposi-
tion and splits into alternative administra-
tive structures in rebel areas that have 
damaged the opposition elsewhere have 
been avoided. An opposition Deraa Provin-
cial Council, composed entirely of cadres 
still living in Hauran, was elected at the end 
of 2014. Among local civic organizations, 
the Civic Defense Council has managed to 
plug a gap in municipal services. The group, 
which is run by two doctors, is close to the 
National Co-ordination Body for Democrat-
ic Change, one of the last opposition groups 
with members present in the country. The 
Supervision and Follow-up Council, which 
is financed by Abdelbasset Abdelsamad, a 
Syrian expatriate in Kuwait from the south-
ern town of al-Geza, has also been effective. 
It has engaged in activities such as building 
a hospital and organizing school exams by 
taking a neutral position toward the differ-
ent armed brigades. But dithering by the 
outside backers of the opposition – with 
regard to how far to push militarily from 
the Hauran against Assad’s seat of power in 
Damascus for fear of a jihadist takeover – 
has actually helped strengthen the Nusra 
Front in southern Syria. 
Nusra’s Restraint 
The emergence of the Nusra Front and the 
Islamic State in 2013 as the most formi-
dable groups among the plethora of anti-
Assad forces across Syria provided outside 
powers justification for hardly extending 
themselves beyond making verbal calls for 
Assad to leave power. Countering indis-
criminate killings of civilians became sec-
ondary to the risk of jihadists replacing the 
regime if Assad fell. In a twisted logic, most 
key members of the MOC – the United States, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emir-
ates, France, and Britain – began seeing 
their priority as containing the jihadists 
rather than supporting military action that 
could undermine Assad, despite blaming 
the Assad regime’s mass killing of civilians 
for stoking jihadism in the country. 
In the south, the Nusra Front was weak 
until the Deraa Military Council started to 
stutter. Support from the MOC became ad 
hoc, to the point that rebels would receive 
just enough weapons to hit minor regime 
targets but not enough to mount large-scale 
attacks. For example, this forced Ahmad 
Fahd Ni’mah, head of the Deraa Military 
Council, to order rebel withdrawal from the 
contested town of Khirbet Ghazaleh in May 
2013. The town lies at a strategic road junc-
ture and Jordan did not want a rebel take-
over to disrupt cross-border container-truck 
movement. As a pragmatic ex-Syrian Air 
Force colonel, Ni’mah realized that the 
opposition could not afford to antagonize 
Jordan. But the withdrawal from Khirbet 
Ghazaleh ended up dealing a blow to the 
morale and reputation of the FSA in the 
south. A year later, the Nusra Front ab-
ducted Ni’mah, and he has not been heard 
from since. His disappearance – and likely 
death – ushered in the demise of the Deraa 
Military Council and left FSA brigades little 
choice but to cooperate with the Nusra 
Front in attacking a series of regime fortifi-
cations to preserve their credibility. 
In September 2013, the hardline jihadists 
received a boost to their efforts to demon-
strate what they regard to be the futility 
of the FSA and cooperation with the West. 
This boost came when the United States 
called off airstrikes against Assad’s forces, 
which were planned in response to a chemi-
cal weapons attack on rebel positions in 
the suburbs of Damascus, in return for a 
Russian-brokered deal for Assad to turn in 
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his chemical weapons and join the Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention. 
Yet, this did not make other Islamist 
brigades more palatable to the Nusra Front. 
In November 2014, the group assassinated a 
commander of another Islamist rebel group 
in Qunaitira on suspicion of belonging to 
the Islamic State. Kassab Masalmeh was the 
spiritual leader of the Free Yarmouk Mar-
tyrs Brigades, named after the Jordan River 
tributary that separates Syria from Jordan. 
Between March and May 2013, the Yarmouk 
Martyrs had briefly abducted 25 UN peace-
keepers from the Syrian side of the Golan 
frontier before releasing them in a move 
that gained them publicity – this was more 
than a year before the Nusra Front engaged 
in a similar abduction. The killing of Masal-
meh weakened the Yarmouk Martyrs, and 
there was a threat that the group would 
become another casualty of the rise of the 
Nusra Front and share a fate similar to that 
of the Syria Revolutionaries Front, a Saudi-
backed FSA brigade that collapsed during 
a lightning offensive by the Nusra Front in 
the northern province of Idlib in 2014. 
Signaling different dynamics in the 
south, FSA units mobilized to rescue the 
Yarmouk Martyrs and deployed in their 
stronghold of Sahm al-Golan, 10 kilometers 
north of the Yarmouk River. The Nusra 
Front backed off, but the killing of Masal-
meh could make it easier for the Yarmouk 
Martyrs to smooth their relationship with 
Jordan, a relationship that had soured over 
its refusal to meet Jordanian requests to 
abandon Masalmeh. Indeed, the group 
appears to have received some funding and 
logistical support from the MOC prior to 
the dispute over Masalmeh. 
The survival of the Yarmouk Martyrs 
group illustrates the limits to Nusra Front’s 
reach as well as the relative capability of 
FSA units to regroup after the demise of the 
Deraa Military Council. Unlike in the north, 
the Nusra Front lacks superiority in numbers 
against other rebels. Moreover, although it 
occasionally sends shots across the bow of 
moderate rebels, in the form of assassina-
tions and kidnappings, the group does not 
appear to have managed to establish a 
popular base, such as in central and north-
ern Syria. A complete jihadist takeover of 
the south therefore appears unlikely. 
But on the battlefield against the regime, 
the Nusra Front reigns supreme, due to its 
willingness to employ suicide bombers and 
the expertise of its fighters. Also, an appar-
ent understanding among the Nusra Front’s 
mostly Jordanian leadership in the south – 
namely that it would gain little from hit-
ting Israel or Jordan – has helped shield it 
from US airstrikes that have been targeting 
the group, as well as the Islamic State, in the 
north and east of the country. 
Israel Loses Golan Stability 
Assad’s forces east of the buffer zone had 
kept the frontier quiet since 1974. This has 
changed since the start of armed confronta-
tions in Syria. In June 2011, a pro-Assad 
Palestinian faction, the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine General Com-
mand (PFLP-GC), sent hundreds of Palestini-
ans in Syria to demonstrate at the Golan 
border, where several were killed by Israeli 
forces. The mobilization was a message 
to Israel that Assad could destabilize the 
region, but it backfired and helped turn 
Palestinian refugees in Syrian camps against 
the regime and its Palestinian proxies. 
The situation has escalated since Hezbol-
lah deployed with Iranian support on the 
Syrian side of the Golan frontier. Strikes by 
Israel on Hezbollah targets and retaliation 
by Hezbollah threatened open warfare 
between the two sides by January 2015. Hez-
bollah has claimed that its presence on the 
Syrian side of the Golan is needed to pre-
vent the Nusra Front from penetrating 
nearby Hezbollah strongholds in south 
Lebanon and has accused Israel of backing 
the jihadist group. Although Israel might 
have lines of communication with jihadists 
in southern Syria, outright support for the 
Nusra Front is unlikely. Still, the presence 
of the Nusra Front in Qunaitira appears 
more preferable to Israel than the possibil-
ity of seeing the Islamic State, which has 
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established a foothold in southern Damas-
cus and in Lajah in eastern Deraa, on its 
borders. The mid-2014 ouster of Nusra Front 
fighters from Deir al-Zor and their redeploy-
ment in Qunaitira have resulted in the 
Nusra Front becoming a bulwark of sorts 
against the Islamic State in southern Syria. 
Amid the chaos, Israel also prefers that 
Assad not fall and that Syrian regime troops 
remain on the opposite side of the Golan 
front, instead of having to face Hezbollah 
there. In September 2014, Syrian dissident 
Kamal al-Labwani, a former political pris-
oner who was at the forefront of the opposi-
tion to Assad before the revolt, visited Israel. 
His visit might encourage others in the op-
position to follow, but Israel was uncom-
fortable with Labwani’s remarks that the 
Syrian opposition should make peace with 
Israel in return for Israeli help in over-
throwing Assad. Israel’s experience in Leba-
non has made Israeli policy-makers wary of 
unreliable proxies. Therefore, the extent of 
Israeli involvement in the conflict has 
remained limited to occasional air strikes, 
reconnaissance, and helping wounded 
Syrian fighters and civilians. 
Moderates Regroup 
Since the Nusra Front abducted Ni’mah, 
two moderate southern commanders have 
emerged, each regrouping FSA brigades 
in largely separate operating theaters and 
under the MOC umbrella. In December 
2014 Bashar al-Zu’bi, a commander who 
comes from a civilian background, formed 
the Southern Hawks Alliance, comprised 
mainly of his own Yarmouk Army, itself 
an amalgamation of Liwa al-Bara and Liwa 
Aisha. Weeks after, Colonel Saber Safar be-
came head of what is called the First Army, 
a merger mainly between his al-Hamza Bri-
gade in northwest Deraa and the al-Omari 
battalion of Lajah Bedouins to the east. The 
Omari battalion fought several battles at 
the end of 2014 with Islamic State fighters 
who had penetrated Lajah. Previously, the 
battalion was a division of the Syria Revo-
lutionaries Front, which was chased out of 
northern Syria by the Nusra Front. When 
brigades were formed to protect their home-
towns during the early days of the uprising, 
southern FSA units were mostly formed 
according to local roots rather than reli-
gious ideology. 
In Kanaker, 30 kilometers southwest of 
Damascus, the local FSA brigade struck a 
deal with regime forces surrounding the 
town, which resulted in a tacit ceasefire 
in 2014. Under the deal, the regime has 
refrained from shelling the town while the 
rebels do not target the garrison next to 
it. In Deraa also, both sides have largely 
refrained from targeting the infrastructure, 
as Deraa provides water for areas under 
the control of the regime in Suwaida, and 
Suwaida sends electricity to Deraa. 
Mergers between different FSA-allied 
groups could lead to a more effective com-
mand-and-control structure, helping to ease 
US concerns about sophisticated weapons 
going to extremists. But the Western-backed 
brigades will continue to play catch-up 
to jihadists unless they can show that they 
have regained the initiative militarily 
against the regime. In this, the Nusra Front 
is not their only hardline rival. In 2013, the 
Muthanna Battalion, a small Salafist move-
ment, emerged as a strong player in the 
city of Deraa. The group attracted members 
away from the FSA largely due to its repu-
tation for discipline and paying salaries on 
time. It has coordinated with the al-Mu’ta-
sim Billah Brigade, an FSA unit set up by a 
cleric from the al-Masri clan. 
Outside Backers Overreach 
The success of the Nusra Front in spear-
heading attacks on regime forces in the 
south and the ease with which Ni’mah was 
captured cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
the support for southern rebels. Indeed, the 
support appears to have dried up in 2014 
against the backdrop of the change in US 
priorities described above. Nonetheless, a 
major regime base in the town of Shaykh 
Maskeen, north of Deraa, fell in January 
2015 to an offensive by jihadist units, in-
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cluding the Nusra Front, and the FSA. The 
town had served as the headquarters of the 
82nd Air Defense Battalion. But the rebel 
advance appears not to have been the result 
of a strategic plan but rather a reaction to a 
regime attack on opposition positions sur-
rounding Shaykh Maskeen. 
In general, the treatment of southern 
rebels by their backers as mere proxies with 
disregard for their cause has created frus-
tration. In 2014, the MOC asked Ibrahim 
Habbous, a southern commander with a 
reputation for competence, to attack Islamic 
State fighters who fled to Hajar al-Aswad 
after being expelled from the eastern 
Damascus suburbs of al-Ghouta by Salafist 
fighters loyal to Zahran Alloush, the Sala-
fist head of the Saudi-backed Army of Islam. 
Habbous did not consider turning his guns 
against the Islamic State to be a priority 
and declined the MOC request. Had he 
agreed, he would have found it difficult to 
convince his own men to forego fighting 
the regime. Consequently, Arab and West-
ern support was cut off from Habbous, and 
his Tahrir al-Sham brigade was diminished. 
Still a respected figure among moderate 
rebels, Habbous maintains lines of com-
munication with Jordan. 
Jordan’s Priorities 
Under pressure from its allies, Jordan, 
along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, has 
hosted US training for several thousand 
fighters since 2012. The kingdom has also 
taken part in the US-led bombing campaign 
against jihadist targets in Syria and Iraq. 
Yet, Jordanian interests in the Syrian con-
flict have been focused – almost from the 
beginning of the revolt – on maintaining 
internal security and commercial transport 
links with Syria. Jordan has not been keen 
on democratic transformation to its north, 
nor would it have liked to see Islamists 
empowered in Syria, thereby emboldening 
the kingdom’s own Muslim Brotherhood. 
Video footage showing the burning of a 
Jordanian pilot by the Islamic State, which 
was broadcast by the group in early Feb-
ruary 2015, has enforced official views that 
Assad is not the most immediate threat. 
Thus, the authorities have refrained from 
public criticism of Assad, like that expressed, 
for example, by Saudi Arabia, which has 
been Jordan’s main financial backer in times 
of need. The kingdom has also opposed the 
Qatari and Turkish approaches to Syria, 
seeing them as encouraging jihadism, and 
has prevented southern opposition figures 
– perceived as being linked with Qatar – 
from operating through Jordan. 
Jordanian recruits, who swelled Nusra 
Front ranks, and a lack of US appetite for 
military action to oust Assad, alarmed the 
kingdom further. The country’s intelligence 
branch, the mukhabarat, became heavily 
involved in the Syria file. Dozens of Syrian 
activists and their families, almost all from 
Deraa, were expelled to Syria in the last few 
weeks of 2014 after having communicated 
with their home regions or having trans-
ferred money back there. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Jordanian officials largely see the conflict in 
Syria as becoming a choice between al-Qaeda 
and the Assad regime, in which they prefer 
the latter. The resilience of the moderate 
rebels and civic organizations in the south 
contradicts this view, which has neverthe-
less been gaining traction internationally. 
Meanwhile, the UN Special Envoy has pur-
sued a “local ceasefires” or “local freezes” 
plan that the Syrian opposition fears will 
result in surrendering contested cities and 
towns to the regime and burying the 2012 
Geneva plan for a political transition. 
Build up an international aid mechanism: 
In the absence of agreement to impose 
much-talked-about no-fly zones to protect 
civilians, Germany should help build an 
international aid mechanism to develop 
the civilian institutions operating in the 
south. These administrative bodies have 
been undermined by the lack of a unified 
structure within the Syrian opposition and 
among the international community to 
channel aid. A non-lethal equivalent of the 
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MOC would help prevent duplication and 
facilitate access by local organizations to 
outside support. 
Facilitate the Syrian interim govern-
ment’s work in the south diplomatically: 
On the opposition side, Germany and other 
European countries have pledged to work 
with the Istanbul-based National Coalition 
of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces 
and its provisional government. But links of 
the latter with the south are weak, partly 
due to Jordan’s caution about dealing with 
opposition figures it regards as being sup-
ported by Qatar and Turkey, especially the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Germany has been 
lending technical assistance to the provi-
sional government to accelerate the award-
ing of projects and monitoring and evalu-
ation mechanisms. Helping extend the 
reach of opposition technical cadres in exile 
to the south would require diplomatic 
work in order to heal rifts between Jordan, 
Qatar, and Turkey over Syria and to lift 
Jordan’s objections about certain opposi-
tion figures. 
Implement lessons learned with regard 
to local ceasefires: Germany has been highly 
supportive of the UN initiative focused 
on trying to reach local ceasefires. But the 
south, as the Kanaker experience shows, 
might be better grounds to pursue a deal 
than Aleppo, where efforts are currently 
centered. Local ceasefires were struck in 
2013–2014 in besieged neighborhoods on 
the outskirts of Damascus, where the rebels 
were militarily weak, leaving the regime 
with little incentive to honor terms of the 
deals, such as allowing the delivery of regu-
lar food supplies. Ceasefires can work when 
there is a balance of power, and interests. 
With its relative stability and a more lim-
ited reach of al-Qaeda, the south could 
become a model in providing an alternative 
administration to the regime and a testing 
ground for functional ceasefires. 
Curb the reach of the regime’s air force: 
Eventually, however, Western and Arab gov-
ernments comprising the MOC will need to 
equip southern rebels with weapons to curb 
the reach of Assad’s air force. Syrian planes 
often bomb targets right at the Syria-Jordan 
border, also raising the need for contingen-
cy plans to react to possible Syrian regime 
retaliation against Jordan if rebels down 
jets in the border zone. Curbing Assad’s air 
force would boost the popularity of the FSA 
and help lessen the indiscriminate killing 
of civilians, and thus work against the radi-
calization of the local population. 
Address the long-term challenge of refugee-
hood in Jordan: Steps also have to be taken 
to improve the lot of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan, where cuts in UN food aid in 2014 
have driven back many refugees into gloomy 
refugee camps in the desert and raised ten-
sions between the refugees and the indig-
enous population. The kingdom has com-
plained that it is not being compensated for 
the strain on its schools and infrastructure. 
But with doubts over whether the kingdom 
is committed to using aid money specifical-
ly to help deal with the refugees, reaching 
an agreement with Western governments 
on how to assist the kingdom has been dif-
ficult. Germany, which has a large water-
assistance program in Jordan and regular 
access to Jordanian officials, could help in 
this regard. At the same time, it should 
help the kingdom to develop a strategy that 
conforms with international human rights 
norms to address what will likely be a long-
term refugee presence. So far, Jordan has 
not taken steps that would encourage the 
refugees to stay in the country, such as op-
portunities for legal access to the labor mar-
ket – a step Turkey took at the end of 2014. 
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